The Iraqi Stage: Between Fake Pluralism and Real Power Struggles
On Tuesday, November 11, 2025, polling stations opened across Iraq for legislative elections touted by Baghdad, Washington, and Tehran as “decisive” for the country’s future. On the ground, however, the picture is far less dramatic: a predictable, tightly controlled ballot overseen by entrenched political parties, regional puppeteers, and met with widespread popular disillusionment.
Iraq’s recent “stability,” often cited by its leaders and foreign partners, has been little more than a deceptive lull. After decades of war, repression under Saddam Hussein, and the catastrophic U.S.-led invasion in 2003, the country may seem quieter—but remains crippled by failing infrastructure, hollowed-out public services, and systemic corruption. Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, seeking a second term, is hoping to ride this illusion of order to consolidate his position.
An Electoral Masquerade Dominated by Shiite Power Brokers
The numbers speak volumes about the disconnect between official rhetoric and the public’s mood: turnout in 2021 was a record-low 41%, and it is widely feared it may sink even lower this year. For many Iraqis, these so-called legislative elections are little more than a redistribution of spoils among Shiite factions, with Iran’s shadow looming large.
The electoral law strongly favors established parties, leaving just 75 independents among 7,700 candidates vying for 329 parliamentary seats. One-third of these candidates are women, and quotas mandate that at least 25% of the assembly be female. But gender optics can’t hide a deeply rigged and ossified political system.
Sadr’s Absence, the Game Rigged from the Start
The conspicuous absence of Shiite cleric and political heavyweight Muqtada al-Sadr is revealing. Once a major player, Sadr has denounced the vote as a “rigged election dominated by sectarian and partisan interests,” and called on his base to boycott. His previous attempt to form a government ended in bitter failure, culminating in violent clashes in Baghdad.
Meanwhile, the Kurdish scene remains fractured between the KDP and the PUK, and Sunni factions are disunited. Former parliamentary speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi is tipped to lead the Sunni bloc, but no fresh leadership is emerging from any front.
Tehran and Washington: The True Observers
Forget UN observers and embedded foreign media. The real scrutiny comes from the corridors of Tehran and the offices of U.S. defense attachés. Each side has its proxies, pressure tools, and red lines. Washington keeps 2,500 troops in the country. Tehran maintains control through its powerful network of Shiite militias, now formally integrated into the state apparatus.
Since early 2024, these groups have halted attacks on U.S. forces under pressure—both domestic and international. But this fragile quiet is not peace. Iraq remains a proxy battleground, not a sovereign democracy.
U.S. special envoy Mark Savaya, himself of Iraqi descent, recently reaffirmed the Trump-era doctrine: “Iraq must be free of malign foreign interference.” A clear jab at Iran, of course—though it conveniently ignores the legacy of American misadventures.
A Closed-Door Election with a Foregone Conclusion
All signs point to an outcome that will reinforce, not reform, the system. This vote offers no national renewal—only a new arrangement of privileges between old power players. The illusion of parliamentary pluralism conceals a grim reality: the real power dynamics lie elsewhere—behind Iranian embassy walls, inside American bases, or, when things spiral, in the streets.
