While official rhetoric still condemns “authoritarian drift,” Washington is quietly reopening diplomatic channels with Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Behind closed doors, a strategic return is underway, as the U.S. seeks to counter growing Russian and Chinese influence in the region.
A Return That Speaks Softly, but Moves Fast
Despite sanctions, moralistic discourse, and frozen aid following the coups between 2020 and 2023, the United States is, as of mid-2025, quietly reentering the Sahelian chessboard. Publicly, the White House maintains its “cautious” and “conditional” stance. Yet two high-level visits, those of Rudolph Atallah and William B. Stevens, mark a sharp tactical turn. The goal, thinly veiled, is to retain military and diplomatic footing in a region increasingly under Russian, Chinese, and even Iranian sway.
The message is clear: targeted cooperation over ideological rupture. Atallah, a former intelligence officer known for his hardline security views and early ties with Mali during the 2010s AQIM fight, visited Bamako with what insiders describe as “a pragmatic cooperation offer.” Washington, it seems, no longer demands democratic perfection, only a partner that is “capable and stable.” This is not just nuance; it’s a pivot.
Avoiding a “Sahel-Afghanistan”
William B. Stevens, during his late July 2025 tour of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, the three founding members of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), said it bluntly: “It would be irresponsible to leave these states isolated under such financial and security pressures.” Translation: the U.S. is wary of a vacuum, one that Moscow’s Africa Corps, Wagner’s successor, is all too eager to fill, particularly in central Mali and eastern Burkina Faso.
Unofficially, U.S. contacts are expanding through NGOs and private security contractors linked to the State Department, creating a shadow diplomacy far more adaptable than France’s rigid, moralistic posture, which has largely backfired in the region.
Security, But Also… Markets
Terrorism isn’t the only entry point. In Bamako, Atallah also pitched the reinstatement of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) for AES countries, a move clearly meant to undercut China’s growing foothold in infrastructure and mining.
Officially, no bilateral military agreements have been signed. But according to Africa Intelligence, technical talks are already underway to resume intelligence sharing and provide non-lethal support, especially drone-based surveillance, to Sahelian armies.
Washington’s Double Discourse
The paradox is hard to miss: while the U.S. officially condemns military rule in Niamey, Ouagadougou, and Bamako, it simultaneously restores operational contacts behind the scenes. The American embassy in Niamey, once half-manned, is now fully operational again. Sanctions remain on paper, but logistical support to the Nigerien army continues via indirect channels, especially in the fight against Boko Haram.
It’s diplomacy with plausible deniability, and realpolitik by another name.
The Sahel, A Silent Grand Chessboard
Despite moralistic postures, the power dynamics are shifting. After a period of strategic paralysis, Washington is recalibrating its presence in the Sahel. This new engagement, still low-key, may soon redefine regional alliances. And if these regimes sense an alternative to total dependence on Moscow, the balance of power could change faster than most Western capitals are willing to admit.
